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Abstract
This paper studies a dynamic two-sided market in which consumers face switching costs
between competing products. I first show that, in a symmetric equilibrium, switching
costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong. By contrast, switching
costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and
consumers are more patient than the platforms. Second, an increase in switching costs on
one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Finally, consumer heterogeneity
such as the presence of more loyal and naive customers on one side intensifies first-period
competition on this side but softens first-period competition on the other side.
Keywords: switching costs, two-sided markets, network externality, naivety, loyalty
JEL Classification: D4, L1
“High price [and] lack of consumption apps... doomed the Surface. They could
have broken through by pricing the Surface aggressively to drive sales volume
that created a pull on app developers. But they didn’t. Consumers stayed
away.”
Hal Berenson, President of True Mountain Group, LLC.1
1 Introduction
In many markets, there are switching costs and network effects. Previous work points out that
large switching costs cause firms to charge a higher price to their locked-in customers, and
large network externalities cause platforms to charge a lower price, yet little is known about
the interaction between the two concepts. This paper studies how switching costs affect price
competition when network externality is present; I find that an increase in switching costs of
one group intensifies price competition for the other group in the introductory period.
∗I thank Marc Bourreau, Giacomo Calzolari, Jacques Cre´mer, Vincenzo Denicolo`, Lapo Filistrucchi, Bruno
Jullien, Alireza Naghavi, Andrew Rhodes, Paul Seabright, and participants in numerous conferences and sem-
inars for helpful comments. Any opinions expressed are those of the author only.
†Toulouse School of Economics, University of Bologna. E-mail: wingmanwynne.lam2@unibo.it
1Quoted from “Will Microsoft get the new Surface(s) right? Part 1,” hal2020.com, May 8, 2014.
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A good example is the smartphone operating system market. Apple, Google and Windows
are key players in the market. Each of them faces two groups of consumers, application users
and application developers. While it is easy for consumers to migrate data from an older
version of Windows Phone to a newer version, a consumer who switches from Android to
Windows Phone incurs the cost of migrating - if not re-purchasing - a set of apps, media files,
as well as contacts, calendars, emails and messages. As suggested by Hal Berenson, one of
the problems faced by Windows Phone is its weak app library. Suppose now that Windows
improves its library by introducing more Android apps. This not only raises the utility of users
through network externality but also lowers their switching cost in terms of data migration.
For instance, making some Android movie or music streaming apps available also for Windows
Phone allows users to migrate their media files across devices more easily without the hassle of
moving the data manually, which results in lower switching costs.2 Such change may seem to be
welfare-improving because the extent to which platforms can exploit their locked-in customers
is smaller. However, in markets with cross-group externalities, where participation of one group
increases the value of participating for the other group, I show that a decrease in switching
costs of the user leads to an increase in the price for developers. Since developers value the
participation of the user and a decrease in switching costs of the user makes attracting users
easier, the platform can price higher to extract rents from developers. As a consequence, lower
switching costs may not improve consumer welfare. It is important that regulators can evaluate
the outcome of these cross-group effects properly. The analysis also provides insight into other
two-sided markets with switching costs, such as media, credit cards, video games, and search
engines.
I consider a simple Hotelling model of duopoly with horizontal differentiation, where plat-
forms 0 and 1 sell their product to consumers whose relative preference for the two platforms
are indexed by their position along a unit interval. Consumers have unitary demand, so that
in each period, each consumer purchases one good from either platform (single-homing). The
penultimate section will extend the analysis to cover the multi-homing case. I assume that
there are both switching costs and network externalities. Moreover, consumers are heteroge-
neous in terms of loyalty and naivety. Loyal consumers are attached to one platform and never
switch.3 Naive consumers are short-sighted and care only about today. This model is flexible
enough that it can collapse to either a pure switching-cost model or to a pure two-sided market
model for extreme parameter values. When both effects are at work, I show that conventional
results may change. I focus on symmetric equilibrium in which platforms charge the same price
to each side. I also show that such equilibrium exists even when parameters on the two sides
are not symmetric.
This paper’s contribution is twofold. First, it studies switching costs together with network
2Klemperer (1995) gives many examples of different kinds of switching costs, for instance, learning costs,
psychological costs, transactions costs, etc. The UK Office of Fair Trading documented some useful case studies.
3A survey published by Consumer Intelligence Research Partners (CIRP) reveals that almost half of smart-
phone buyers stay loyal to their previous brand, with Apple having the highest loyalty rate. This survey was
taken from data surveying 500 subjects in the US who had purchased a new mobile phone in the previous 90
days over the last four quarters, between July 2012 and June 2013.
2
externalities, whereas the existing literature has tended to focus on either of them. Discussing
the two together is important - I show that switching costs work differently in a two-sided
market and this result has important implications for consumer protection. In a one-sided
market, switching costs may intensify or soften first-period price competition depending upon
how patient consumers are relative to platforms; but in a two-sided market, under strong
externalities, higher switching costs always make the first-period more competitive. I also find
that there is a cross-effect: higher switching costs on one side unambiguously reduce the price on
the other side. The second contribution relates to the investigation of consumer heterogeneity
that has been neglected in the two-sided market literature. In particular, this model provides
a general framework for examining how switching costs affect the pricing strategy of platforms
depending on consumers’ characteristics, such as sophistication and loyalty, which traditional
arguments cannot deal with.
The main results can be summarized as follows. When cross-group externalities are weak,
whether higher switching costs make the market more competitive in the first period depends on
two forces. On the one hand, more patient consumers are less tempted by a temporary price cut
because they understand that the price cut will be followed by a price rise in later periods. Their
demand is therefore less elastic, and platforms will respond by charging higher prices. On the
other hand, more patient platforms put more weight on future profits, and thus both compete
aggressively for market share. Switching costs make markets more competitive if platforms are
relatively more patient than the consumers. By contrast, when externalities become sufficiently
strong, platforms’ incentive to lock consumers in becomes stronger because by capturing one
group of consumers, it helps to convince the other group to join. Consequently, higher switching
costs cause the platform to charge a lower price in the first period. Additionally, there is a
cross-group effect: an increase in switching costs on one side unambiguously decreases the price
on the other side. The reason is that platforms can build market share either directly through
one side or indirectly through the other side. When switching costs on one side are large, an
easier way to build market share is to focus on the indirect channel; consequently first-period
competition is increased on the other side (Proposition 5).
Considering consumer heterogeneity, I show that platforms offer lower prices to one side if
there are many naive and loyal consumers. The intuitive reason is that after consumers make
their purchase in the first period, consumers who are loyal know that they will patronize the
same platform for an indefinite period of time, and feel that they deserve a bigger carrot in the
first period. The presence of naive consumers, who care only about immediate cost and reward,
gives even more incentive to platforms to compete aggressively. Platforms charge higher prices
to one side if on the other side there are more naive consumers. This is because higher price
elasticity on the side with more naive consumers reduces the opportunity cost of recruiting
consumers on the other side. Therefore, it leads to less competitive behavior on the other side
(Proposition 7).
These results yield clear policy recommendations. First, since asymmetric price structures
are common in two-sided markets, attractive introductory offers do not necessarily call for
consumer protection as in one-sided markets. Second, if disloyal consumers do not know their
preferences in the first period, platforms may provide imprecise information about their tastes,
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so that these consumers are less loyal, and they will switch more, which platforms can exploit
later. Therefore, there is room for government intervention, particularly in achieving a greater
transparency of information. Disloyal consumers would benefit from more information, so that
they are able to make choices that are best aligned to their tastes. As a result, they can build
loyalty more easily and save considerable switching costs.
1.1 Related Literature
There is a sizeable literature on switching cost, which broadly speaking, can be categorized
into two main groups.4 One group of papers assumes that firms cannot discriminate between
old and new consumers. Firms knowing that they can exercise market power in the second
period over those consumers who are locked-in, they are willing to charge a lower price in the
first period in order to acquire these valuable customers. This “bargains-then-ripoff” pattern
is the main result of the first-generation switching-cost models (see for instance Klemperer
(1987a, b)). A second group of works allows for price discrimination, so firms can charge a
price to its old customers and a different price to new ones. Chen (1997) analyzes a two-period
duopoly with homogeneous goods. Under duopoly, consumers who leave their current supplier
have only one firm to switch to. Since there is no competition for switchers, this allows the
duopolist to earn positive profits in equilibrium. Taylor (2003) extends Chen’s model to many
periods and many firms. With three or more firms, there are at least two firms vying for
switchers, and if products are undifferentiated, these firms will compete away all their future
profits. More recent contributions include Biglaiser, Cre´mer and Dobos (2013), which studies
the consequence of heterogeneity of switching costs in an infinite horizon model with free entry.
They show that even low switching cost customers are valuable for the incumbent.
The design of pricing strategies to induce agents on both sides to participate has occupied
a central place in the research on two-sided markets.5 The pioneering work is Caillaud and
Jullien (2003), who analyze a model of imperfect price competition between undifferentiated
intermediaries. In the case where all agents must single-home, the only equilibrium involves one
platform attracting all agents and the platform making zero profit. In contrast, when agents
can multi-home, the pricing strategy is of a “divide-and-conquer” nature: the single-homing
side is subsidized (divide), while the multi-homing side has all its surplus extracted (conquer).
Armstrong (2006) advances the analysis by putting forward a model of competition between
differentiated platforms by using the Hotelling specification. He finds that the equilibrium price
is determined by the magnitude of cross-group externalities and whether agents single-home
or multi-home. His approach is the closest to mine. However, he focuses on a static model of
two-sided market without switching costs, while here with switching costs and different degrees
of sophistication the problem becomes a dynamic one. Another closely related paper is Rochet
and Tirole (2006), who combine usage and membership externalities (as opposed to the pure-
usage-externality model of Rochet and Tirole (2003), and the pure-membership-externality
4Farrell and Klemperer (2007), and Klemperer (1995) provide excellent overviews on the literature of con-
sumer switching costs.
5See Rysman (2009) for a survey of the literature on two-sided markets.
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model of Armstrong (2006)), and derive the optimal pricing formula. But they focus on the
analysis of a monopoly platform.
Substantial studies have been separately conducted in the dual areas of switching costs and
two-sided markets, but analysis is rarely approached from a unified perspective. This paper
seeks to fill the gap. Besides this study, there is little literature that studies the interaction
between switching-costs and network externalities. Su and Zeng (2008) analyze a two-period
model of two-sided competing platforms. Their focus is on the optimal pricing strategy when
only one group of agents has switching costs and their preferences are independent, while this
paper studies a richer setting in which both sides bear switching costs, and consumers are
heterogeneous in terms of loyalty and naivety. Therefore, one can view Su and Zeng (2008) as
a special case of my model. Biglaiser and Cre´mer (2014) study the effect of switching costs and
network externalities on competition, but they do not address the issue in a two-sided context.
2 Model
Consider a two-sided market with two periods. There are two groups of consumers, denoted A
and B, such as smartphone users and application developers. Assume that for some exogenous
reasons in each period consumers choose to single-home. Section 5.1 will extend the analysis
to cover the multi-homing case. Both sides of consumers have switching costs: side i (A or B)
consumers have to incur switching cost si ≥ 0 if they switch platform in the second period.
On each side, consumers are heterogeneous in two dimensions. First, consumers can be naive
or rational. Naive consumers, who are a fraction αi of the population on side i, make decisions
based on their first-period utility; while rational consumers, who form a fraction 1− αi of side
i’s population, make decisions based on their lifetime utility. Therefore, on each side, naive
consumers have δi = 0, while rational consumers have δi > 0.
6 Moreover, I distinguish the
firm’s discount factor, denoted δF , from the consumer’s discount factor δi. Second, consumers
learn whether they are loyal or not after their purchase in the first period. With probability
µi consumers’ preferences do not change and they never switch (“loyal”), and with probability
1−µi their preferences are re-distributed on the unit interval in the second period (independent
preferences).7 Independent preferences are needed for technical reason because it smooths the
demand function. Since not all consumers have changing preferences in practice, I assume that
there are some loyal consumers. There are two competing platforms, denoted 0 and 1, which
enable the two groups to interact. Consider a simple Hotelling model, where consumers on
6This is different from Klemperer (1987b) because he does not consider the possibility of having a mixture
of naive and rational consumers. Consumers are either all naive or all rational.
7Loyalty in this model can be interpreted in two ways: First, it can be interpreted as exogenous. Loyal
consumers are not able to switch because they have large switching costs. Second, loyalty can be interpreted
as endogenous. Suppose that switching cost is drawn from a two-point distribution: s is small with probability
1 − µ, and s is big with probability µ. In this case, the concept of loyalty is endogenized because it is
determined by switching costs. Both interpretations lead to the same calculations, but for simplicity I adopt
the first interpretation for the rest of the analysis.
Klemperer (1987b) makes a similar assumption, but he assumes that those consumers, who have fixed tastes,
respond to prices in both periods.
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each side are assumed to be uniformly located along a unit interval with the two platforms
located at the two endpoints. Both αi and µi are known by the platforms. Throughout the
paper, we assume that platforms cannot price discriminate among his previous customers and
customers who have bought the rival’s product in the previous period.
The utility of a consumer on side i is
vi + ein
j
k,t − |x− k| − pik,t,
where i, j ∈ {A,B} , i 6= j since the two sides are symmetric. vi is the intrinsic value of
consumers on side i for using either platform. Assume that vi is sufficiently large such that the
market is fully covered. ei is the benefit that consumer from side i enjoys from interacting with
each agent on the other side (for simplicity, I ignore the possibility that consumers also care
about the number of people in the same group who joins the platform). Suppose that each
side is of mass 1, so that nik,t is the number of agents from side i (A or B) who are attached
to platform k (0 or 1) in period t (1 or 2), while the number of agents from the same side
in the same time period who are attached to the other platform is denoted 1 − nik,t. Thus,
ein
j
k,t is the total external benefit from interacting with the other group. The location of the
consumer is denoted x. To keep things simple, I assume unit transport cost. Thus, |x − k| is
the transport cost when the consumer purchases from platform k. Platform charges are levied
on a lump-sum basis: each agent from side i incurs a cost of pik,t when he joins platform k at
time t.
Platform k’s profit at time t is given by
pik,t = p
A
k,tn
A
k,t + p
B
k,tn
B
k,t, (1)
which is the sum of revenues from side-A and side-B. I make three assumptions. First, assume
that the marginal cost of production is equal to zero for simplicity. Second, assume that
si ∈ [0, 1), where one is the unit transport cost, so that at least some consumers will switch.
Third, assume ei ∈ [0, 1) in order to ensure that the profit function is well-defined, and the
demand is decreasing in a platform’s own price and increasing in its rival’s price.8
The timing of the game is as follows.
• In the first period, consumers are unattached. They learn their preferences. Platforms
set the first-period price. Consumers choose which platform to join.
• In the second period, consumers learn their switching cost and whether they are loyal or
not.9 Platforms set the second-period price. Consumers decide to switch or not.
The solution concept for the game is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
8More specifically, one represents the unit transport cost. Assuming ei < 1 ensures that in the symmetric
equilibrium, both platforms serve some consumers.
9The analysis is the same even if consumers learn their switching cost in the first period. However, if they
know whether they are loyal or not in the first period, the calculation changes slightly, but qualitative results
should hold.
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2.1 Second Period: the mature market
I work backward from the second period, where each platform has already established a cus-
tomer base. Given the first-period market shares nA0,1 and n
B
0,1, a consumer on side i, located
at θi0 on the unit interval, purchased from platform 0 in the first period is indifferent between
continuing to buy from platform 0 and switching to platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,2 − θi0 − pi0,2 = vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θi0)− pi1,2 − si.
The indifferent consumer is given by
θi0 =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,2 − 1) + pi1,2 − pi0,2 + si].
Another consumer on side i, positioned at θi1, previously purchased from platform 1 is
indifferent between switching to platform 0 and continuing to purchase from platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,2 − θi1 − pi0,2 − si = vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θi1)− pi1,2.
The indifferent consumer is given by
θi1 =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,2 − 1) + pi1,2 − pi0,2 − si].
We then substitute θi0 and θ
i
1 into the following.
ni0,2 = µin
i
0,1 + (1− µi)ni0,1θi0 + (1− µi)(1− ni0,1)θi1. (2)
Consumers of platform 0 consists of three types, and similarly for platform 1. The first type
is loyal customers, who buy from platform 0 in both periods. The second type is switchers
(whose preferences are unrelated in the two periods), who did not switch away from platform
0. The third type is also switchers, but they switched away from platform 1 to platform 0.
Then, we solve for the market shares, plug them into the profit functions, and solve for the
equilibrium prices. The details are shown in Appendix A.
2.1.1 Effect of Switching Costs on Second-period Pricing
Proposition 1. Given first-period market share, on each side, the platform with a larger market
share increases the second-period price as switching costs increase; whereas the other platform
with a smaller market share decreases the second-period price as switching costs increase.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The literature calls this price a “ripoff” because the second-period price paid by consumers
in equilibrium is higher in a market with switching costs than in a market without switching
costs.10 However, the extent of the ripoff depends on market share. There are two possible
strategies: On the one hand, the platform might want to exploit its existing customers with
10As will be seen later, the second-period price in my model is pi0,2 =
1−ej(1−µi)
1−µi , which is larger than the
price in a two-sided market model without switching costs, pi = 1− ej .
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a high price because switching costs give platform market power over the consumers who are
locked-in. On the other hand, the platform might want to poach its rival’s customers with
a low price. Proposition 1 shows that the platform with a larger market share charges a
higher second-period price as switching costs increase because it focuses more on exploiting old
customers than on poaching new customers; whereas the platform with a smaller market share
charges a lower second-period price in order to win back some customers.
Notice that if the market share is equal between platforms, then switching cost has no effect
on the second-period price, which is indeed the case when we solve the full equilibrium. The
reason is that when platforms have an equal share of the market, their incentives to exploit old
customers offset their incentives to attract new customers.
Proposition 2. Given first-period market share, the second-period price paid by consumers on
side i is increasing in switching costs of consumers on side j if
(i) Consumers on side j are more valuable (ei > ej), and platform 0 has a larger market
share on side j (nj0,1 > 1/2), or
(ii) Consumers on side i are more valuable (ei < ej), and platform 0 has a smaller market
share on side j (nj0,1 < 1/2).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 runs as follows. Part (i) shows that consumers on side
j are more valuable to the platform because they exert stronger externalities on consumers on
side i compared to externalities of side i on side j. If the platform has a larger market share
of the more valuable side, it can charge higher second-period prices to both sides compared to
the case without switching costs. That is, ∂pj0,2/∂sj > 0 from Proposition 1, and ∂p
i
0,2/∂sj > 0
from (i) of Proposition 2.
By contrast, part (ii) shows that if the platform has a smaller market share of side j, accord-
ing to Proposition 1 it will focus more on poaching side j with a low price than exploiting them
with a high price, that is, ∂pj0,2/∂sj < 0. It will then charge a higher second-period price to side
i because decreasing the price on side j reduces the “opportunity cost” of recruiting consumers
on side i: the platform loses less revenue on side j by recruiting one less consumer on side i.11
Both platforms thus compete less aggressively for them. Consequently, higher switching costs
on side j cause the platform to charge a higher price on side i, that is, ∂pi0,2/∂sj > 0. Note that
what platform 1 will do is just the opposite of platform 0 because of the asymmetric market
shares.
In a one-sided market with switching costs, a platform’s market share is an important
determinant of its pricing strategy because it affects the platform’s future profitability (see
11Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) explain that the difference between a one-side market and a two-sided
market lies in the change in this opportunity cost. In particular, the standard Lerner formula becomes
pi − (c− pj)
pi
=
1
ηi
in a two-sided market, where c is the marginal cost and η is the price elasticity.
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Klemperer (1995)); in a multi-sided market it is crucial to also take into consideration network
externalities. Relying on a one-sided logic may overestimate potential anti-competitive effects:
according to Proposition 1 the second-period price tends to increase with switching cost on
the side that the platform has a larger market share; but this does not necessarily imply anti-
competitive motives in two-sided markets, since according to Propositions 2 larger margin on
one side could be translated into smaller or even negative margin on the other side depending
on the magnitude of externalities.
2.1.2 Effect of Switching Costs on Second-period Profit
Consider the case, where (i) the platform’s first-period market shares of the two sides are not
too small, and (ii) cross-group externalities are not too different from each other.
Proposition 3. Platform’s second-period profits are increasing in switching costs on one side
if it has a larger market share on this side than the other platform, and decreasing in switching
costs if it has a smaller market share.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In the literature, switching costs typically raise platforms’ profits in the second period
of a market with switching costs as compared to a market without switching costs because
platforms charge a higher price to repeat buyers. However, Proposition 3 shows that whether
second-period profits increase or decrease with switching costs depends on market share and
cross-group externalities.
2.2 First Period: the new market
I now turn to the first-period equilibrium outcomes when consumers are unattached. All
consumers have discount factor δi. However, on side i, a proportion αi of consumers are naive
(N) with δi = 0. They make decisions based on their first-period utility only. A proportion
1 − αi of side i’s population is rational (R) with δi > 0. They make decisions based on their
lifetime utility.
A naive consumer on side i located at θiN is indifferent between buying from platform 0 and
platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,1 − θiN − pi0,1 = vi + ei(1− nj0,1)− (1− θiN)− pi1,1,
which can be simplified to
θiN =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1) + pi1,1 − pi0,1].
As for sophisticated consumers, they also take into consideration their second-period utility.
If a sophisticated consumer on side i located at θiR joins platform 0 in the first period, his
expected second-period utility is given by
U i0,2 = µi(vi + ein
j
0,2 − θiR − pi0,2) + (1− µi)
∫ θi0
0
(vi + ein
j
0,2 − θiR − pi0,2)dx
+ (1− µi)
∫ 1
θi0
(vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θiR)− pi1,2 − si)dx.
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U i0,2 is the sum of three terms. With probability µi the consumer is loyal and chooses to join
platform 0 in both periods; with probability (1 − µi)θi0 he has independent preferences but
still chooses to stay with platform 0; and with probability (1− µ)(1− θi0) he has independent
preferences and he switches to platform 1.
Similarly, if he joins platform 1 in the first period, his expected second-period utility is
given by
U i1,2 = µi(vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θiR)− pi1,2)
+ (1− µi)
∫ 1
θi1
(vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θiR)− pi1,2)dx
+ (1− µi)
∫ θi1
0
(vi + ein
j
0,2 − θiR − pi0,2 − si)dx.
A sophisticated consumer on side i is indifferent between purchasing from platform 0 and
platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,1 − θiR − pi0,1 + δiU i0,2 = vi + ei(1− nj0,1)− (1− θiR)− pi1,1 + δiU i1,2.
After some rearrangement, this gives
θiR =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1) + pi1,1 − pi0,1 + δi(U i0,2 − U i1,2)].
The first-period market share of side i is
ni0,1 = αiθ
i
N + (1− αi)θiR. (3)
Then, we can derive the profit functions, and solve for the equilibrium prices. Calculations
are rather involved and interested readers can refer to Appendix B.
I focus on the platform-symmetric equilibrium: both platforms charge the same price to
each side, that is, pA0,1 = p
A
1,1 and p
B
0,1 = p
B
1,1.
Proposition 4. The single-homing model has a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Although I focus on a symmetric equilibrium, the existence of it does not require all param-
eters on the two sides to be symmetric. I show the existence condition, Equations (B.1) and
(B.2), in Appendix B. In the next section, I will discuss the comparative statics of the price.
3 Discussion
The analysis of the effect of switching costs on first-period prices is complicated as several
effects are at play. An easier way to interpret the result is to start the discussion from pure
switching-cost model (a` la Klemperer) and pure two-sided market model (a` la Armstrong), and
then turn to the main model of the paper: a two-sided market model with switching costs. In
addition, I will study other interesting ingredients such as loyalty and naivety.
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3.1 Pure Switching-cost Model
In a one-sided market with switching costs, all consumers are rational; network externalities
and consumers’ loyalty do not matter. Assuming that αi, µi, ei = 0, i ∈ {A,B}, the first-period
equilibrium price becomes
pi0,1 = 1 +
2
3
( δis
2
i︸︷︷︸
consumer′s anticipation
− δF si︸︷︷︸
firm′s anticipation
),
which is equivalent to Equation (18) in Klemperer (1987b).
Since the level of the first-period price is lower in a market with switching costs than without
them, the literature calls it a “bargain”. This pattern of attractive introductory offers followed
by higher prices to exploit locked-in consumers (see Proposition 1) - the “bargains-then-ripoffs”
pricing - is well-known in the switching-cost literature.
However, the extent of the bargain depends on switching costs. More specifically, the first-
period price is U-shape in switching costs. There are two effects at work: On the one hand,
rational consumers anticipate that if they are locked-in in the second period, the platform
will raise its price. Thus, consumers are less responsive to a first-period price cut. This
explains why consumers’ sophistication increases the first-period price through δi. On the other
hand, forward-looking platforms have strong incentive to invest in market share because they
anticipate the benefit of having a larger customer base in the future. Platforms thus compete
more aggressively to capture market share, and platforms’ sophistication decreases the first-
period price through δF . While the platform’s anticipation effect is first-order in switching costs,
the consumer’s anticipation effect is only second-order. Therefore, the platform’s anticipation
effect dominates initially, the first-period price decreases with switching costs; and later the
consumer’s anticipation effect becomes more powerful, and thus the first-period price increases
with switching costs.12 Consequently, we get the U-shape relationship.
3.2 Pure Two-sided Market Model
In a simple model of two-sided markets, there is only one period, so that δF , δi, αi = 0; and
loyalty and switching costs are irrelevant, so that si, µi = 0, i ∈ {A,B}.
The first-period equilibrium price is simplified to
pi = 1− ej,
which is the same as in Proposition 2 of Armstrong (2006). This equation shows that platforms
compete fiercely for the more valuable group, whose external benefit exerted on the other group
of consumers is larger.
12Different papers use different terminologies, for example, Somaini and Einav (2013) use “anticipation effect”
and “investment incentive”, while Rhodes (2013) uses “consumer elasticity effect” and “investment effect”. I
simply call them consumer’s and firm’s anticipation effect because the mechanism goes through the discount
factor. My paper is quite different from Somaini and Einav (2013) and Rhodes (2013): they examine the
effect of switching costs in a dynamic setting without network externalities, while I discuss a model with both
switching costs and network externalities.
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3.3 Switching Costs in Two-sided Markets
More generally, in a two-sided market with switching costs, I find that the “bargain” can be
increasing in switching costs when externalities are strong, which is different from Klemperer’s
result. This model is a good representation of markets such as smartphone and video games.
Smartphone: switching from Apple’s iOS to Google’s Android system, application developers
need to re-code their programs for different interfaces, as well as to create additional support
and maintenance; whereas application users need to migrate and re-purchase their applications.
Video games: switching from Sony’s PlayStation to Windows’ Xbox, gamers need to re-learn
how to use the controller and lose the progress of their games, whereas developers have to buy
a separate development kit to create games for different consoles.
Proposition 5. In the single-homing model, with all consumers and both platforms equally
rational, δi = δF = δ > 0 and αi = 0; independent preferences, µi = 0; and symmetric
externalities, ei = e > 0, i ∈ {A,B},
i. If externalities are weak, on each side the first-period price pi0,1 is U-shape in switching
costs si.
ii. If externalities are strong, on each side the first-period price pi0,1 is decreasing in switching
costs si.
iii. The first-period price charged to side i, pi0,1, is decreasing in switching costs on side j, sj.
Proof. See Appendix C.
As in Klemperer (1987b), the first-period price is lower with switching costs than without,
which represents a bargain. This paper, however, finds that the extent of the bargain depends
not only on switching costs on one side, but also on externalities and switching costs on the
other side.
More specifically, part (i) shows that when externalities are weak, we get the result of
Klemperer: the bargain is inverted U-shape in switching costs. For small switching costs, ra-
tional consumers understand that they can easily switch in the second period, and are therefore
more responsive to price cut in the first period. Platforms have strong incentive to compete
for market share. Consequently, switching costs are pro-competitive when they are small. By
contrast, when switching costs are very large, rational consumers recognize that they will be
exploited in the second period, and are therefore less tempted by a price cut. Their demand
becomes less elastic, and platforms will respond by charging higher prices. This explains why
switching costs are anti-competitive when they are large.
Interestingly, part (ii) shows that strong externalities overturn the U-shape result: in this
case the bargain is increasing in switching costs, and the positive relationship between the
first-period price and switching costs does not arise. The intuition is that externalities provide
an additional downward push on the first-period price because recruiting one side helps to get
the other side on board. This strengthens the incentives of platforms to invest in market share,
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which dominates the incentive of rational consumers to avoid being locked-in. Consequently,
switching costs always make the market more competitive when externalities are strong.
Part (iii) shows that an increase in switching costs on one side unambiguously decreases
the first-period price charged to the other side. The reason is that platforms can build market
share on side j via two channels: directly through side j, and indirectly through side i. When
switching costs on side j are large, rational consumers are less responsive to price cuts because
they expect a price rise to follow in the second period. An easier way to build market share on
side j is then to focus on the indirect channel, i.e. attracting side i. As a result, first-period
competition is increased on side i.
Proposition 5 also provides new insights into the two-sided market literature. While Arm-
strong (2006) shows that prices are decreasing in externalities, I focus on the effect of the
interaction between network externalities and switching costs on prices.
3.4 Naive Consumers
A straightforward interpretation of naive consumers is that these consumers only care about
utility in the current period. Or this could also be interpreted as the case in which consumers
are different in every period.13
Proposition 6. In the single-homing model, when all consumers are naive, δi = 0 and αi = 1;
and have independent preferences, µi = 0, i ∈ {A,B}, the first-period price pi0,1 is decreasing
in switching costs si regardless of the level of externalities.
Proof. See Appendix D
The intuition underlying this proposition is as follows. When consumers are naive, they
do not anticipate that a first-period price cut will lead to a second-period price rise, and will
therefore react more responsively to price cut in the first period. This increases the incentives
of platforms to reduce the first-period price in order to gain more market share. Since naive
consumers have no incentive to avoid being locked-in, the platform’s incentive to compete for
market share dominates. This explains the fierce price competition for naive consumers.
Strictly speaking, expectation about whether the others will switch play no role here because
µi and αi are known. In a broader sense, however, Proposition 6 can be interpreted as in line
with earlier work by von Weizsa¨cker (1984) and Borenstein, MacKie-Mason and Netz (2000).
They show that if consumers expect that a firm’s price cut is more permanent than their tastes,
which can be interpreted as consumers being naive, then switching costs tend to lower prices.
3.5 Heterogeneous Consumers
I now turn to discuss, rather than having all consumers being rational or naive, the consequence
of having heterogeneous consumers. On each side, a fraction αi of consumers are naive, while
13For example, a company buys some software for their workers in the first period. Some workers leave
the company in the second period, and purchase their own software. These workers have a switching cost of
learning some new software that are different from that purchased by their company, but the company will not
take into consideration this switching cost when buying in the first period.
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1−αi of them are rational; and a proportion µi consumers are loyal, while the remaining ones
have independent preferences.14
Proposition 7. In the single-homing model,
i. On each side, the first-period price pi0,1 is decreasing in the proportion of naive consumers
αi, if the proportion of loyal consumers, µi, is high.
ii. The first-period price on side i, pi0,1, is increasing in the proportion of naive consumers
on side j, αj.
iii. The first-period price pi0,1 is decreasing in the discount factor of the platform δF .
Proof. See Appendix E.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. Part (i) shows that on each side, if there
are many loyal consumers, the first-period price is lower with naive consumers than without.15
The reason is that after consumers make their purchase in the first period, consumers who are
loyal know that they will patronize the same platform for an indefinite period of time, and feel
that they deserve a bigger carrot in the first period. Naive consumers, who care only about
today, are more attracted by a price cut. Therefore, increasing the proportion of consumers
who are loyal and naive makes the market more competitive in the first period.
Part (ii) shows that an increase in the proportion of consumers who are naive on one side
will soften price competition on the other side. Intuitively, the demand of naive consumers
on side j is more elastic, and platforms will react by charging lower prices. This, in turn,
reduces the opportunity cost of recruiting consumers on side i. Platforms thus compete less
aggressively for market share on side i. Consequently, consumers’ naivety on one side mitigates
the ferocity of first-period competition for market share on the other side.
Part (iii) shows that first-period prices are lower when platforms are more patient. Platforms
compete harder on prices because they foresee the advantage of having a large customer base
in the future.
More generally, Propositions 5 and 7 say that the strategy of lowering price is not simply
due to network externalities in a two-sided market, a view that is central to the work of Rochet
and Tirole (2003), and Armstrong (2006). But in my model whether the platform will act
more aggressively also depends on the characteristics of consumers and their switching costs.
This has important implications on regulations that alter switching costs and loyalty rate in
real circumstances, which will be explored more fully in Section 4.
14Gabszewicz, Pepall and Thisse (1992) also discuss heterogeneous consumers in terms of brand loyalty,
but they consider the pricing strategy of a monopoly incumbent, who anticipates the entry of a rival in the
subsequent period, and focus on the effect of loyalty on entry.
15If consumers’ tastes change (µ < 1), it may nullify the competitive effect of naivety.
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3.6 A Special Case: asymmetric sides
The model also covers the case of asymmetric sides, where consumers on one side, say side-B, do
not incur any switching costs in the second period (sB = 0). Examples of such a market include
browsers, search engines, and shopping malls. Browsers: Internet users can switch relatively
more easily between Internet Explorer, Chrome, and Firefox than content providers because
when content providers switch, they need to rewrite the codes so that they are compatible
with the new browser. Search engines: customers can switch easily between Google, Bing and
Yahoo in as little as one click, but there are switching costs for top-listed publishers, who want
their website to appear on the top list of another search engine. Shopping malls: shoppers are
free to go to any shopping malls, but there are high transaction costs for shops in terminating
the old contract and initiating a new one.
For simplicity, assume that consumer preferences are independent, µi = 0; all consumers are
rational, αi = 0; and they have the same discount factor as the firm, δi = δF = δ, i ∈ {A,B}.
Corollary 1. If only one side of consumers has switching costs, then switching costs only affect
the price on this side but not the other side.
Proof. Under the assumptions above,
pB0,1 = 1− eA.
The intuition is that since preferences of side-B consumers in the two periods are unrelated
and they do not have switching costs, every period’s choice is independent. This means that
the first-period price is not affected by the second-period price. Consequently, although side-A
consumers’ switching costs affect side-B’s second-period price through externalities, it does not
affect side-B’s first-period price.
3.7 Effect of Switching Costs on First-period Profit
In a platform-symmetric equilibrium, the two platforms share consumers on each side equally,
that is nA0,1 = n
B
0,1 = 1/2. Therefore, the expected profit of platform 0 is
pi0 =
1
2
pA0,1 +
1
2
pB0,1 + δpi0,2,
where pi0,2 is the second-period profit.
Differentiating pi0 with respect to si, we obtain
∂pi0
∂si
=
1
2
∂pi0,1
∂si
+
1
2
∂pj0,1
∂si
because the profit in the last period, pi0,2, is not affected by si in equilibrium.
As is well-known from the switching-cost literature, switching costs raise platforms’ profits
in the second period compared to the case of no switching costs as second-period prices are
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usually higher. However, the presence of market power over locked-in consumers intensifies
competition in the first period, and this may result in a decrease in overall profit.16
More interestingly, I identify an additional channel through which switching costs can re-
duce overall profit, namely, when network externalities are strong. The reason is that strong
externalities increase the incentives of platforms to vie for market share, and therefore switch-
ing costs on side i intensify price competition on side i (see (ii) of Proposition 5). Higher
switching costs on side i also lead to more competitive behavior on side j because capturing
more consumers on side j is a cheaper way to build market share on side i. Side i consumers
are harder to attract as they have strong incentives to avoid being locked-in and thus paying
large switching costs in the second period (see (iii) of Proposition 5). Higher switching costs
lower prices on both sides, and thereby reducing overall profit.
4 Welfare and Policy Implications
The first-period welfare is constant in switching costs because all consumers buy one unit of
good, the size of the two groups is fixed, and the whole market is served. It ignores the possible
demand-expansion and demand-reduction effects of switching costs as the total demand is fixed.
However, the second-period welfare is decreasing in switching costs. The welfare loss is the
sum of two deadweight losses:
2(1− µi)[ (1− si
2
)si︸ ︷︷ ︸
DWL from switchers
+
s2i
4︸︷︷︸
DWL from non−switchers
].
Consider consumers who have independent preferences. Since their tastes will change in the
second period, for those who have previously bought from platform 0, consumers whose tastes
change a lot will switch to platform 1 with probability (1− si)/2 and each pays si; consumers
whose tastes change a little will continue to buy from platform 0 even though they prefer
platform 1. This happens with probability si/2 and each suffers an average loss of mismatch
with an inferior product si/2. Similarly, consider consumers who have previously bought from
platform 1. Consumers on both sides suffer this loss. As for loyal consumers, there is no loss
for them because first, they do not switch; second, their preferences do not change, and hence
there is no deadweight loss associated with mismatch.17
Although switching costs lower social welfare, from the consumer welfare point of view,
consumers may still benefit from switching costs if the equilibrium price is lower. I therefore
suggest the following policy implications. In one-sided markets, attractive introductory offers
that induce early adoption may call for consumer protection in later periods, for example,
through compatibility or standardization policies that lower switching costs. In two-sided mar-
kets, asymmetric price structures are common because they help to increase the participation
16See for instance Klemperer (1987a).
17Naivety does not affect welfare. The only thing that matters for welfare is whether consumers’ preferences
change or not. When consumers’ preferences do not change, they make the right product choice and do not
switch. When consumers’ preferences change, switchers have to incur the switching costs, and some of the
non-switchers are forced into buying an inferior product that does not match their tastes.
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of different groups of consumers. For example, Proposition 2 shows that sj may have a positive
or negative impact on pi0,2, and Proposition 5 shows that the relationship between p
i
0,1 and si
depends on e, and pi0,1 decreases with sj. Therefore, when policy-makers alter switching costs
of one group, it may have broader repercussions on the other group; sticking to a one-sided
logic may lead to inefficient policies.18
In this model, I assume that all consumers know their preferences in the current period,
but tastes of some consumers may change. One could alternatively interpret a fraction µi of
consumers know their preferences, while 1−µi of them do not know theirs. Disloyal consumers
receive a signal about their tastes in the first period, and after buying from the platform, they
know their tastes in the second period. This would not change the result as long as the signal is
uniformly distributed. This allows us to evaluate the effect of information transparency policy.
For example, Proposition 7 shows that loyalty makes it more likely that naivety will hurt the
platform. Thus, platforms may lack incentive to enhance consumers’ understanding of their
own preferences. They might try to provide imprecise information about consumers’ tastes,
so that consumers are less loyal, and they will switch more, which platforms can exploit later.
Therefore, there is room for government intervention. In particular, increasing transparency
of information would enable disloyal consumers to make choices that are best aligned to their
tastes, build loyalty and save switching costs.
5 Extensions
The analysis so far is based on a single-homing model, but this is not the only market config-
uration in reality. There are various ways to extend the model, for instance, one may consider
the case where one group single-homes while the other group join both (commonly termed as
“competitive bottlenecks”). It might also be interesting to consider asymmetric platforms. I
will sketch these extensions in turn.
5.1 Competitive Bottlenecks
Suppose that side A continues to single-home, while side B may multi-home. Competitive
bottleneck framework is typical in markets such as computer operating systems, and online air
ticket and hotel bookings. Operating systems: users use a single OS, Windows OS, Apple’s
Mac OSX platform or Linux-based OS, while engineers develop software for different OS.
Travel bookings: consumers use one comparison site such as skyscanner.com, lastminute.com
or booking.com, but airlines and hotels join multiple platforms in order to gain access to each
comparison site’s customers. Since side B can join both platforms, switching costs and loyalty
on this side are not relevant, so that sB, µB = 0.
19 The main difference from the single-homing
18Wright (2004) also shows that analyzing a two-sided market as if it was a one-sided market may lead to
some policy errors. Different from him, however, this paper identifies some new issues raised by switching costs
in two-sided markets that have not been discussed previously.
19Note that the concept of multi-homing is not compatible with switching costs in the current framework. I use
two examples to illustrate. First, think of the smartphone market. If the option to multi-home means consumers
are able to use both iPhone and Android systems, then it is not reasonable to impose an additional learning
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model lies in the market share of side-B consumers, which can be described as follows. In
period t, t ∈ {1, 2}, a side-B consumer located at θB0,t is indifferent between buying and not
buying from platform 0 if
vB + eBn
A
0,t − θB0,t − pB0,t = 0,
which can be simplified to
θB0,t = vB + eBn
A
0,t − pB0,t.
Similarly, a side-B consumer located at θB1,t is indifferent between buying and not buying from
platform 1 if
vB + eB(1− nA0,t)− (1− θB1,t)− pB1,t = 0,
which can be simplified to
θB1,t = vB + eB(1− nA0,t)− pB1,t.
We solve the game by backward induction as before. Consider the symmetric equilibrium.
Appendix F proves the existence of it. We can then derive the equilibrium prices.
Proposition 8. In the multi-homing model, with all consumers and both platforms equally
rational, δi = δF = δ > 0 and αi = 0; independent preferences, µi = 0; and symmetric
externalities, ei = e > 0, i ∈ {A,B},
i. For the single-homing consumers, if externalities are weak, the first-period price pA0,1 is
U-shape in switching costs sA. If externalities are strong, the first-period price p
A
0,1 is
decreasing in sA.
ii. If the market is fully covered, then first-period prices tend to be higher on the multi-
homing side and lower on the single-homing side with respect to the single-homing model
in Section 3.6.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Part (i) implies that for single-homing consumers stronger externalities make it more likely
that first-period equilibrium prices decrease with switching costs, which is consistent with
Proposition 5 in the single-homing model. As for multi-homing consumers, both switching
costs and the degree of sophistication do not affect the price paid by them because each
period’s choice is independent. This case and the previous case of asymmetric sides have
similar intuition because sB, µB = 0. Part (ii) is different from results in the single-homing
model. Since side B multi-homes, there is no competition between the two platforms to attract
this group. Compared with the case of asymmetric sides, the higher first-period price faced
cost on them if they switch platform. Another example is the media market. If multi-homing means that
advertisers are free to put ads on either or both platforms, then it does not make sense to impose an additional
switching cost on these advertisers. One may argue that we can distinguish between learning switching costs
(incurred only at a switch to a new supplier) and transactional switching costs (incurred at every switch), as
in Nilssen (1992), but switching costs are not relevant on the multi-homing side because learning costs and
transaction costs are equivalent in a two-period model. This also explains why it is not useful to consider the
case in which both sides multi-home.
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by the multi-homing side is a consequence of each platform having monopoly power over this
side, and the large revenue is used in the form of lower first-period price to convince the
single-homing side to join the platform.
Before, in the single-homing model, switching costs do not affect the first-period welfare,
but lowers the second-period welfare. However, in the multi-homing model switching costs
affect first-period welfare through participation, which is, in turn, determined by the price. In
the second period, switching cost has no effect on price because platforms have an equal share
of the market, and their incentives to exploit old customers offset their incentives to poach new
customers. If switching costs reduce first-period price (see (i) of Proposition 8, especially when
externalities are strong), then switching costs may increase welfare.20 This is because lower
price induces more consumers to multi-home, and more multi-homing consumers increases the
utility of single-homing consumers.
5.2 Asymmetric Platforms
Let us now consider asymmetric platforms. The cost of switching from platform 0 to 1, denoted
s0, is different from the cost of switching from platform 1 to 0, denoted s1. As an example,
some say “iPhones are more expensive than most Samsung smartphones.”21 Can we attribute
the difference in the pricing of devices between Apple and Samsung to the fact that Apple
has successfully built an ecosystem that makes users hard to switch? To address this question,
consider two groups of consumers who are asymmetric in the sense that only consumers on side
A incur switching costs in the second period. For simplicity, assume that all consumers single-
home. Consider a numerical example where δA = δB = δF = 0.8, µA = µB = 0, eA = eB = 0.5,
s1 = 0.5, and s0 ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Pricing with Asymmetric Platforms.
20If there is quality choice as in Anderson et al. (2013), then welfare effects are less clear-cut: platform’s
investment in quality may change depending on whether multi-homing is allowed.
21NBC News, “Apple is biggest US phone seller for first time,” 1 February 2013, by Peter Svensson. http:
//www.nbcnews.com/technology/apple-biggest-us-phone-seller-first-time-1B8210244
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The results are illustrated in Figure 1. Panel (a) presents the first-period pricing, and panel
(b) shows the second-period pricing as functions of switching costs s0. Pricing of platform 0
is shown with a solid line, and that of platform 1 is drawn as a dotted line. It is shown that
if s0 < s1, platform 1 charges a lower price than platform 0 in the first period, but a higher
price in the second period. The intuitive reason is that since platform 1 is relatively more
expensive to switch away from in the second period, it is willing to charge a lower price in the
first period in order to acquire more customers whom it can exploit later. On the contrary, if
s0 > s1, platform 1, knowing that consumers will easily switch away tomorrow, will raise its
price today. This result holds as long as externalities are not too strong.22
6 Conclusion
This paper has characterized the equilibrium pricing strategy of platforms competing in two-
sided markets with switching costs. The main contribution is that it has provided a useful
model for generalizing arguments already used in the switching-cost and the two-sided market
literature, and for extending beyond traditional results. In line with earlier research, there are
some conditions under which switching costs reduce first-period prices but increase second-
period prices (a` la Klemperer); and prices tend to be lower on the side that exerts a stronger
externalities (a` la Armstrong). However, this model develops the idea further by proving that
in a dynamic two-sided market - as opposed to a merely static one - under weak externalities,
switching costs soften price competition in the first period if consumers are significantly more
patient than the platforms; under strong externalities, switching costs always make the market
more competitive. In terms of consumer heterogeneity, the presence of more loyal and naive
consumers on one side intensifies price competition in the first period on this side.
The analysis could be extended in a number of different directions. First, this paper has
taken switching costs as an exogenous feature of the market. Future research could consider
endogenous switching costs. Second, this paper has focused on a two-period model, and it would
be useful to understand the extent to which the results carry over to a multi-period model.
Finally, this paper has explored heterogeneity such as loyalty and naivety, but one can think
of other forms of heterogeneity across consumers. For example, within-group switching costs
may be different between the technologically advanced customers and the less advanced ones.
Within-group externalities may also be different: youngsters use applications more heavily, and
therefore care more about network externalities than their older counterparts, many of whom
only use their smartphones for phone calls and text messages. However, including these forms
of heterogeneity will complicate the analysis considerably. The current model captures a lot
of ingredients in reality, yet is sufficiently tractable to allow for a complete characterization of
the equilibrium. This seems to be a reasonable first step to extend a literature that has not
fully explored the implications of consumer heterogeneity.
22For large externalities (e→ 1), symmetric equilibrium does not exist because there is coordination problem.
Given that externalities are so strong, all consumers might want to join one platform only.
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Appendices
A Second Period Equilibrium
Solving for nA0,2 and n
B
0,2 in Equation (2) simultaneously, we obtain the second-period market
shares as follows:
ni0,2 =
γ + βi + (1− µi)(pi1,2 − pi0,2) + ei(1− µi)(1− µj)(pj1,2 − pj0,2)
2γ
,
where
γ =1− (1− µA)(1− µB)eAeB,
βi =(2n
i
0,1 − 1)(µi + (1− µi)si) + (2nj0,1 − 1)(1− µi)ei(µj + (1− µj)sj).
Because ei < 1, we have γ > 0.
Substituting the market shares into the profit function in Equation (1), and differentiating
it with respect to the prices, we obtain the following equations.
∂pi0,2
∂pi0,2
= ni0,2 −
pi0,2
2γ
(1− µi)−
pj0,2
2γ
ej(1− µi)(1− µj),
∂pi1,2
∂pi1,2
= 1− ni0,2 −
pi1,2
2γ
(1− µi)−
pj1,2
2γ
ej(1− µi)(1− µj).
Solving the system of first-order conditions, one finds the following second-period equilib-
rium prices.
pi0,2 =
1− ej(1− µi)
1− µi +
ηiλi + iλj
(1− µi)∆ , (A.1)
pi1,2 =
1− ej(1− µi)
1− µi −
ηiλi + iλj
(1− µi)∆ .
where
∆ = 9− (1− µA)(1− µB)(eA + 2eB)(eB + 2eA) > 0,
λi = (2n
i
0,1 − 1)(µi + (1− µi)si),
ηi = 3− ej(ej + 2ei)(1− µi)(1− µj) > 0,
i = (1− µi)(ei − ej).
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiate Equation (A.1) with respect to si, we have
sign
∂pi0,2
∂si
= sign(ni0,1 −
1
2
),
∂pi0,2
∂si
=− ∂p
i
1,2
∂si
.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiate Equation (A.1) with respect to sj, we have
sign
∂pi0,2
∂sj
= sign(ei − ej)(nj0,1 −
1
2
),
∂pi0,2
∂sj
=− ∂p
i
1,2
∂sj
.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The second-period profit of platform 0 is
pi0,2 = p
A
0,2n
A
0,2 + p
B
0,2n
B
0,2
=
[
1− eB(1− µA)
1− µA +
ηAλA + AλB
(1− µA)∆
] [
1
2
+
3λA + (1− µA)(eA + 2eB)λB
2∆
]
+
[
1− eA(1− µB)
1− µB +
ηBλB + BλA
(1− µB)∆
] [
1
2
+
3λB + (1− µB)(eB + 2eA)λA
2∆
]
.
The first-order conditions with respect to sA and sB are
∂pi0,2
∂si
=
∂pi0,2
∂λi
(2ni0,1 − 1)(1− µi),
where
∂pi0,2
∂λi
=
ηi
(1− µi)∆
[
1
2
+
3λi + (1− µi)(ei + 2ej)λj
2∆
]
+
3
2∆
[
1− ej(1− µi)
1− µi +
ηiλi + iλj
(1− µi)∆
]
+
j
(1− µj)∆
[
1
2
+
3λj + (1− µj)(ej + 2ei)λi
2∆
]
+
(1− µj)(ej + 2ei)
2∆
[
1− ei(1− µj)
1− µj +
ηjλj + jλi
(1− µj)∆
]
.
Therefore,
sign
∂pi0,2
∂si
= sign(ni0,1 −
1
2
)
if
∂pi0,2
∂λi
> 0.
For ∂pi0,2/∂λi > 0, we need n
A
0,1 and n
B
0,1 not too close to zero, as well as eA and eB are not too
different.
B First Period Equilibrium
The indifferent rational consumer is given by
θiR =
1
2
+
ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1) + pi1,1 − pi0,1 + δi(µi + (1− µi)si) [(1−µi)(ei+2ej)λj+(3−∆)λi](1−µi)∆
2(1 + δiµi)
.
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Substitute θiN and θ
i
R into Equation (3), and solve simultaneously for n
A
0,1 and n
B
0,1:
ni0,1 =
1
2
+
ei(1− κj)(pi1,1 − pi0,1) + τj(eiτi + σi)(pj1,1 − pj0,1)
2[(1− κi)(1− κj)− (eiτi + σi)(ejτj + σj)] ,
where
τi =αi +
1− αi
1 + δiµi
,
κi =
δi(µi + (1− µi)si)(3−∆)(1− αi)(µi + (1− µi)si)
(1− µi)∆(1 + δiµi) ,
σi =
δi(µi + (1− µi)si)(ei + 2ej)(1− αi)(µj + (1− µj)sj)
∆(1 + δiµi)
.
The expected profit of platform 0 is
pi0 = p
A
0,1n
A
0,1 + p
B
0,1n
B
0,1 + δFpi0,2.
The first-order conditions for maximizing pi0 with respect to p
A
0,1 and p
B
0,1 are given as follows.
∂pi0
∂pi0,1
= ni0,1 − pi0,1
τi(1− κj)
2ϕ
− pj0,1
τi(ejτj + σj)
2ϕ
+ δF
[
∂pi0,2
∂ni0,1
∂ni0,1
∂pi0,1
+
∂pi0,2
∂nj0,1
∂nj0,1
∂pi0,1
]
where
ϕ =(1− κi)(1− κj)− (eiτi + σi)(ejτj + σj),
∂pi0,2
∂ni0,1
=
[
6
(1− µi)∆ +
(ei − ej)− (ei + ej)(ej + 2ei)(1− µj)
∆
]
(µi + (1− µi)si) def= ξi.
Similarly, there are two first-order conditions for platform 1.
I focus on the platform-symmetric equilibrium, where pA0,1 = p
A
1,1 = p
A and pB0,1 = p
B
1,1 = p
B.
I derive the sufficient condition for the existence of such symmetric equilibrium, which requires
that platform k’s profit is concave in its prices. The concavity condition is as follows.
1− κA > eAτA + σA > 0; 1− κB > eBτB + σB > 0. (B.1)
In addition to Equation (B.1), to ensure that the platform does not deviate from the
equilibrium price, we need the following condition:
vi +
1
2
ei − 1
2
>
1
1− µi − ei > (vi +
1
2
ei − 1
2
)µi, i ∈ {A,B} . (B.2)
The first inequality means that we need vi to be big enough such that the market is covered.
The second inequality means that we need µi to be small enough and vi to be big, but not too
big, in order to guarantee that the platform does not deviate to serve only loyal consumers in
the second period. For example, Equations (B.1) and (B.2) are satisfied when αi is big and/or
µi = 0 is small.
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23When αi = 1, we obtain the same existence condition for a symmetric equilibrium as in Armstrong (2006).
I show that the equilibrium exists for a wider range of parameters.
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Under symmetric equilibrium, the first-period equilibrium prices for side A and side B are
given respectively by
pA0,1 =
1− κA
τA
− σB
τB
− eB − δF ξA; pB0,1 =
1− κB
τB
− σA
τA
− eA − δF ξB, (B.3)
and the second-period equilibrium prices are given by
pA0,2 =
1− eB(1− µA)
1− µA ; p
B
0,2 =
1− eA(1− µB)
1− µB .
C Proof of Proposition 5
If δA = δB = δF = δ > 0, αA = αB = 0, µA = µB = 0, and eA = eB = e > 0, Equation (B.3)
becomes
pi0,1 = 1− e+
δ
3(1− e2)
[
(2− 3e2)s2i − 2(1− e2)si − esisj
]
.
Differentiating pi0,1 with respect to si, we obtain
∂pi0,1
∂si
=
δ
3(1− e2)
[
2(2− 3e2)si − 2(1− e2)− esj
]
,
∂2pi0,1
∂s2i
=
2δ(2− 3e2)
3(1− e2)
{
> 0 if e <
√
2/3,
< 0 if e ≥√2/3,
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=0 =
δ
3(1− e2)
[−2(1− e2)− esj] < 0.
Therefore, pi0,1 is U-shape in si if e <
√
2/3, and decreasing in si if e ≥
√
2/3.
Differentiating pi0,1 with respect to sj, we get
∂pi0,1
∂sj
= − δesi
3(1− e2) < 0.
Therefore, pi0,1 is decreasing in sj.
D Proof of Proposition 6
If δA = δB = 0, αA = αB = 1, and µA = µB = 0, Equation (B.3) becomes
pi0,1 = 1− δF
[
6 + ei − ej − (ei + ej)(ej + 2ei)
∆
]
si − ej.
Differentiating it with respect to si, we obtain
∂pi0,1
∂si
< 0.
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E Proof of Proposition 7
Differentiating Equation (B.3) with respect to αA, αB and δF , we obtain the following:
∂pi0,1
∂αi
{
≤ 0, if µi → 1 or ei, ej → 0,
> 0, if µi → 0 and ei, ej → 1,
since
∂pi0,1
∂αi
> 0 if
µi + 2µi(1− µi)si + (1− µi)2s2i
µ2i + 3µi(1− µi)si + (1− µi)2s2i
>
∆
3
.
∂pi0,1
∂αj
≥ 0.
∂pi0,1
∂δF
= −ξi ≤ 0.
F Proof of Proposition 8
The first-order conditions of pik, k ∈ {0, 1}, with respect to pA0,1 and pB0,1 are, respectively,
nAk,1 −
1
2ω
pAk,1 −
e
2ω
pBk,1 −
δ
2ω
∂pik,2
∂nA0,1
= 0,
nBk,1 − (1 +
e2
2ω
)pBk,1 −
e
2ω
pAk,1 −
δe
2ω
∂pik,2
∂nA0,1
= 0,
where
ω = 1− e2 − δs
2
A(e
2 − 2γ)
3γ
.
Using similar proof as in the single-homing model, the symmetric equilibrium exists in the
multi-homing model. The existence conditions are as follows. First, platform k’s profit is
concave in its prices if ω ≥ 0, which means that δ, sA and e are not too big.
Second, we need to ensure that the platform does not deviate to sell only to loyal consumers
on side A.
vA + e(
vB
2
+
e
2
)− 1
2
> 1− (1− µA)e2 − evB
2
>
[
vA + e(
vB
2
+
e
2
)− 1
2
]
µA,
or equivalently, µA is small, and vB is big, but not too big.
The first-period equilibrium prices are as follows.
pA0,1 =1− e2 −
δ(3e2 − 2)s2A
3(1− e2) −
2δsA
3
− vBe
2
,
pB0,1 =
vB
2
.
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For part (i), differentiate pA0,1 with respect to sA.
∂pA0,1
∂sA
= −2δ
3
− 2δ(3e
2 − 2)sA
3(1− e2) ,
∂2pA0,1
∂s2A
= −2δ(3e
2 − 2)
3(1− e2)
{
> 0 if e <
√
2/3,
< 0 if e ≥√2/3,
∂pA0,1
∂sA
|sA=0 = −
2δ
3
< 0.
Therefore, pA0,1 is U-shape in sA if e <
√
2/3, and decreasing in sA if e ≥
√
2/3.
For part (ii), we compare the first-period prices paid by consumers who bear switching costs
(side-A) and those who do not (side-B) in the multi-homing model (denoted mh) with that in
the single-homing model in Section 3.6 (denoted sh).
For side-A,
pAmh < p
A
sh if e+
vB
2
> 1.
For side-B,
pBmh > p
B
sh if e+
vB
2
> 1.
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